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Abstract
Self-enhancement is a pervasive motivation that manifests broadly to promote and protect the
positivity of the self. Research suggests that self-enhancement is associated with improved task
performance. Untested, however, is whether that association is causal. The present research
experimentally manipulated self-enhancement to examine its causal effect on task performance.
Participants in five experiments were randomly assigned to self-enhance or not before
completing a creativity task (Experiments 1-4) or pain-inducing cold-pressor task (Experiment
5). Results indicate that self-enhancing (but not self-effacing) on a dimension relevant (but not
irrelevant) to the task facilitated performance. Furthermore, the data were consistent with the
possibility that the performance facilitating effect of self-enhancement was mediated through
task-relevant self-efficacy.
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Does Self-Enhancement Facilitate Task Performance?
“I'm not the greatest; I'm the double greatest.”
Muhammad Ali (BBC Sport, 2007)
Muhammad Ali’s aptitude for boxing was closely matched by his impressive flair for
self-promotion. When questioned about his golf game, he explained, “I’m the best. I just haven’t
played yet” (BBC Sport, 2007). Such ennobling sentiment is not unique to Ali and can be heard
echoing from most sporting events in chants of “We’re number 1” and, more generally, within
ourselves. Indeed, though it is typically expressed more subtly than Ali’s proclamations, selfenhancement is a pervasive motivation. The purpose of the current work is to experimentally test
whether self-enhancement affects task performance. Asked in regard to Ali, for example, was
self-promotion part of his arsenal along with talent and training that propelled him to the top?
Asked more generally, does self-enhancement facilitate performance?
The Self-Enhancement Motive
Self-enhancement (i.e., concern for promoting and protecting the positivity of the self;
Alicke & Sedikides, 2009, 2011) coexists as one of four self-evaluative motives (Sedikides,
1993; Sedikides & Strube, 1995), with the others being self-assessment (i.e., concern for
accurately knowing one’s self; Festinger, 1954; Trope & Ben-Yair, 1982), self-verification (i.e.,
concern for confirming what one knows about the self; Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003), and
self-improvement (i.e., concern for improving known flaws of the self; Lockwood & Kunda,
1997; Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995). Self-enhancement is frequently examined in regard to a
positively biased social-comparison of self relative to others (Heck & Krueger, 2015; Kwan,
John, Kenny, Bond, & Robbins, 2004; Sedikides et al., 2015). This approach derives from
Festinger’s (1954) seminal idea that persons are apt to engage in social comparison when
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reflecting on domains that lack an objective basis of appraisal. The quintessential example of a
self-enhancing social comparison is the tendency for people to deem themselves to be better than
the average person (Alicke, 1985; Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Guenther & Alicke, 2010).
Self-enhancement, of course, is not limited to social comparison and manifests broadly in
judgment, memory, affect, and behavior (Alicke & Sedikides, 2011; Baumeister, 1998; Kunda,
1990; Tesser, 1988). Persons, for example, have superior memory for positive than negative selfrelevant attributes (Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003),
experience stronger positive affect when recalling positive events than negative affect when
recalling negative events (Ritchie, Sedikides, & Skowronski, 2016), selectively engage in
contexts that highlight positive rather than negative self-aspects (Sedikides, 1993), desire social
feedback that emphasizes their positivity (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Cai, 2012), expect to receive
positive feedback from social interactions (Hepper, Hart, Gregg, & Sedikides, 2011), selectively
affiliate with persons and groups who reflect favorably on the self (Cialdini et al., 1976; Tesser,
1988), avoid social comparison following poor performance on self-relevant domains (Gibbons,
Persson Benbow, & Gerrard, 1994), make internal attributions for personal success and external
attributions for personal failure (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999), take credit for group success and
deny blame for group failure (Mullen & Riordan, 1988; Schlenker & Miller, 1977), behave in
ways that excuse the self for impending failure (Jones & Berglas, 1978; Tice, 1991), derogate the
validity of failure feedback (Shepperd, 1993), and devalue dimensions on which the self fails
(Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998; Tesser, 1988).
The critical component of self-enhancement is engagement of the self as the principal
referent. In particular, manipulations of whether persons adopt a self versus an other-person
perspective reveal that positively biased processes manifest when the self is the referent. For
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example, the tendency to (a) select contexts that reveal positive but not negative aspects of a
person occurs when assessing the self but not when assessing other people (Sedikides, 1993), (b)
better recall positive than negative events occurs when remembering events about the self but not
events about another person (even when the events are held constant; Sedikides, Green,
Saunders, Skowronski, & Zengel, 2016), (c) experience stronger positive than negative recalldependent affect occurs when the past is recalled from a first-person (self) than a third-person
(other) perspective (Skowronski, Sedikides, Xie, & Zhou, 2015), and (d) expect positive
feedback from social interactions occurs when thinking about the interactions as involving the
self but not other persons (Hepper, Hart, Gregg, Sedikides, 2011). Hence, people are not
perpetually Pollyanna. They are distinctly self Pollyanna. As the name of the motive implies, it is
engagement of the self as referent for which self-enhancement functions.
In contrast to its broad manifestation, the expression of self-enhancement is usually
subtle and strategic rather than blatant and rampant due to the social costs of being perceived as
arrogant, demeaning, and less moral (Colvin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Heck & Krueger, 2016;
Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, Robins, 2004; Leary, Bednarski, Hammon, & Duncan, 1997;
Paulhus, 1998; Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Van Damme, Hoorens, & Sedikides, 2016). Hence,
self-enhancement is characterized by its tactical nature that is sensitive to contextual pressures
(Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Its signature tendency, for example, is to be expressed on
dimensions of importance and centrality to the self and to be muted on dimensions of lesser
importance and centrality (Alicke, 1985; Dunning, 1995). This tactical quality has spawned
debate as to whether the self-enhancement motive is a byproduct of western culture (e.g., Heine
Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) or a human
universal (e.g., Gaertner, Sedikides, Cai, & Brown, 2010; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Cai, 2015).
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Self-Enhancement and Task Performance
In their landmark article, Taylor and Brown (1988) offered several propositions regarding
self-enhancement. Most notably, they proposed that positive (not veridical) self-perception is
characteristic of and essential to mental health. That proposal generated much controversy (e.g.,
Colvin & Block, 1994) and subsequent research revealed that self-enhancement indeed has
mixed consequences. On the one hand, as we discussed, self-enhancement is associated with
detrimental social phenomenon such as garnering negative perceptions in the eyes of others (e.g.,
arrogance, disagreeable; Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002; Bonanno, Rennicke, &
Dekel, 2005; Leary et al., 1997; Paulhus, 1998) and poor social skills (Colvin, Block, & Funder,
1995). On the other hand, self-enhancement is associated with a host of positive outcomes, such
as better psychological adjustment and wellbeing (Bonanno et al., 2002; Taylor, Lerner,
Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003; Zuckerman & O’Loughlin, 2006), less psychological
distress after trauma (Gupta & Bonanno, 2010), and higher self-esteem and ego-resiliency
(Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003). Such favorable associations have been documented
cross-sectionally (Taylor et al., 2003; Gaertner, Sedikides, & Chang, 2008), longitudinally
(Bonanno et al., 2002; Zucketman & O’Loughlin, 2006), and experimentally (O’Mara, Gaertner,
Sedikides, Zhou, & Liu, 2011).
Most relevant to the current work, Taylor and Brown (1988) additionally proposed that
self-enhancement facilitates task performance. Furthermore, they ventured a process through
which it might do so: they reasoned that self-enhancement fosters a sense of efficacy, which in
turn promotes task success. Research, at least in a piecemeal fashion, is consistent with this
possibility. Self-efficacy, for example, is a catalyst of success (e.g., Bandura, 1982; Bandura &
Cervone, 1983; Wood & Locke, 1987). Likewise, self-efficacy itself develops from favorable
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performance feedback (Bandura & Jourden, 1991) and favorable social comparison feedback
(Klein, 1997). Hence, it is plausible that self-enhancing one’s abilities might promote a sense of
efficacy even in the absence of actual performance or social comparison information. As we
subsequently review, a growing literature suggests that there is merit to the basic notion that selfenhancement facilitates performance.
Much of the existing studies examine self-enhancement and performance in an academic
context because grade point average (GPA) provides a verifiable outcome to index whether
performance has improved. Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, and Kuyper (1999), for example, tracked
students across the academic year and found that to the extent to which students self-enhanced at
the start of the study (i.e., rated themselves as better than their classmates in a given course) their
subsequent grades improved beyond their earlier grades. Similarly, work on academic
exaggeration indicates that self-enhancement in regard to current performance (i.e., reporting
one’s GPA to be higher than it actually is) increases subsequent actual GPA (Gramzow, Elliot,
Asher, & McGregor, 2003; Gramzow, Johnson, & Willard, 2014; Willard & Gramzow, 2009).
Exaggeration of a current versus past performance appears to be an important distinction.
Gramzow and Willard (2006), for example, demonstrate that the former is more strongly related
to self-enhancement motivation than is the latter: college students’ exaggeration of a current
performance (i.e., college GPA) correlates with their tendency to rate themselves as above
average across a number of important attributes but their exaggeration of a past performance
(i.e., Scholastic Achievement Test, SAT) does not. Likewise, Robbins and Beer (2001) estimated
collegiate self-enhancement against the standard of a past performance (i.e., high school GPA
and SAT) and found no association with subsequent collegiate performance. Hence, estimating
self-enhancement in regard to past performance may unwittingly diminish its observed potential
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on subsequent performance. Whereas, exaggeration of current performance has been found
repeatedly to predict improvement in subsequent performance (Gramzow et al., 2003; Gramzow
et al., 2014; Willard & Gramzow, 2009).
Overview of the Present Research
Rather than measuring self-enhancement, which can be fraught with difficulties (Heck &
Krueger, 2015; Kwan et al., 2004; Willard & Gramzow, 2009), we manipulate it by randomly
assigning participants to engage in self-enhancing thought. That is, we vary whether participants
engage in a self-favoring pattern of memory and judgement through which self-enhancement
naturally manifests. We do so by adapting a manipulation previously used to experimentally test
whether self-enhancement promotes wellbeing (O’Mara et al., 2012). In that study, participants
in the United States and China completed measures of wellbeing and a week later listed a
personally important trait and self-enhanced or self-effaced in regard to that trait according to the
following randomly assigned instructions (with the effacement instructions denoted in brackets;
p. 160):
Think back over the past 7 days – replay in your mind the things you have done
and experienced. In as much detail as possible describe how the things that you
have done and experienced demonstrate how that most important trait you listed
above is [not] descriptive of whom you are as a person. That is, explain, with
examples from the past 7 days, how that most important trait is more [less]
characteristic of you than it is of other college students.
Participants then completed the wellbeing measures from the previous week. In both countries,
self-enhancement increased wellbeing from baseline and self-effacement produced no change.
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In five experiments, we adapt that manipulation with three modifications to test
experimentally whether self-enhancement promotes performance. One modification is replacing
the wellbeing measures with a performance task. We examine performance on a creativity task in
Experiments 1 – 4 and, for a conceptual replication, on an endurance cold-pressor task in
Experiment 5. To be clear, our interest is not in creativity or endurance, per se. Instead, we use
creativity and endurance as platforms on which to test the process of whether and how selfenhancement affects performance. A second modification is replacing the longitudinal
assessment, which provides a measure of regressed change, with a between-subjects comparison
against a control condition in which randomly assigned participants complete the same
performance criteria as do participants in other conditions without experiencing selfenhancement (or other) instructions. A third modification is replacing the procedure of having
participants generate an idiosyncratic dimension of self-enhancement (i.e., personally important
trait) with a procedure in which participants self-enhance in regard to the dimension of the
performance criterion. Indeed, another way to conceptualize Gramzow and colleagues’
distinction between exaggeration of a current vs. past performance is whether self-enhancement
occurs on a dimension that is relevant or not to the task at hand. Participants in Experiment 1, for
example, are randomly assigned to self-enhance, self-efface, or do neither (control) in regard to
creativity before completing the creativity task. To test whether self-enhancement must be task
relevant we include as a fourth condition of Experiment 2 the idiosyncratic procedure in which
participants self-enhance on a self-generated attribute before completing the creativity task.
To examine issues of moderation and mediation, we simplify Experiments 3 – 5 to a
between-subjects comparison of task-relevant self-enhancement versus the no-enhancement
control. Experiments 3 and 4 examine the possibility that the effect of self-enhancement on task
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performance is moderated by ability. Perhaps self-enhancement is beneficial only for persons
who have a capacity for the task. Ennobling himself as “the greatest,” for example, might have
aided Ali in his boxing pursuit, but would likely have a negligible effect for the current authors.
Experiments 3, 4, and 5 assess mediators of self-enhancement. All three of those experiments
examine the mediating potential of vitality. That is, self-enhancement might generate feelings of
energy or “getting psyched-up” and such ensuing vitality might promote task success.
Experiments 4 and 5 additionally examine Taylor and Brown’s (1988) proposition that selfenhancement fosters self-efficacy, which in turn promotes task success.
When testing moderation and mediation we employ methods that aid in the interpretation
of those effects. When testing moderation we measure the presumed moderator before
participants experience the self-enhancement manipulation to ensure that the manipulation does
not affect the measured moderator. When testing mediation we counterbalance whether the
presumed mediator is measured before or after the performance task to rule out the possibility
that it is performance influencing the mediator, rather than vice-versa. In particular, participants
could draw inferences about their vitality or efficacy from their in-situ performance on the task,
which would yield patterns that appear consistent with mediation but are actually an artifact of
measurement order. The latter would emerge as an interaction between self-enhancement and
order such that the enhancement manipulation affects the presumed mediator when it is
measured after, but not before, the performance task.
Experiment 1
Participants and Procedure
Eighty-six female undergraduates at a Southeastern university participated for partial
credit in an introductory psychology course. (All ensuing studies included males and females and
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sex did not moderate the patterns). Participants were recruited for a larger study of dyadic
interaction and instead completed the current protocol when they were the only person to arrive.
We collected data across two academic semesters and determined sample size by the length of
the academic year remaining from the start of the study (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011)
We randomly assigned participants to the control condition (n = 29), self-enhancement condition
(n = 27), or the self-effacement condition (n = 30).
Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants sat in an individual cubicle, were informed
that the study examined creativity, and rated the personal importance of creativity (1 = not at all
important to 10 = very important). We introduced the topic of creativity at the start of the session
so that it would be salient to all participants and not surprisingly they regarded creativity as
highly important (M = 7.58, SD = 1.46, which differed from the scale midpoint of 5.50, t(84) =
13.12, p = .0001). Participants in the control condition then completed the creativity task in
which they had 5 min to brainstorm in writing on separate slips of paper as many uses as they
could for a brick and they repeated the task for another 5 min brainstorming uses for a candle
(Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998). Participants in the other two conditions
completed the same creativity task but they did so after writing a narrative in which they selfenhanced or self-effaced in regard to creativity as specified by the following instructions (with
the self-effacement variations noted in brackets):
Think back over the past 7 days – replay in your mind the things you have done and
experienced. In as much detail as possible describe how the things that you have done
and experienced demonstrate how being creative is [not] descriptive of whom you are as
a person. That is, explain, with examples from the past 7 days how creativity is more
[less] characteristic of you than it is of other college students.
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After completing the creativity task, participants were debriefed and thanked.
Results
Two judges independently read the written narratives to ensure that participants selfenhanced or self-effaced as instructed. On that basis, we excluded one participant from the selfenhancement condition yielding an effective sample size of 85.
To assess whether self-enhancement facilitates task performance, we conducted two
analyses. One examined the number of solutions participants generated in the creativity task and
the other examined the perceived creativity of those solutions as determined by two independent
judges who were blind to condition. We transcribed the solutions into an excel file (one row per
solution, with one file for brick and one file for candle), hid the participant identifier, and,
randomly sorted the rows so that the transcribed solutions were no longer nested within
participant (this ensured that judges would not infer creativity from the number of solutions
generated by a given participant). Each judge was provided a copy of the brick and candle files
and rated the creativity of each solution (1 = not at all creative to 5 = extremely creative). The
inter-rater reliability and correlation was high between judges for each object, α brick = .81, rbrick =
.68 and αcandle = .82, rcandle = .71. We created a subjective creativity score for each participant by
averaging the judges’ ratings across the solutions. We misplaced solutions from three
participants before transcription (one from the control condition and two from the selfeffacement condition) yielding an effective sample size of 82 for this outcome.1
Number of solutions. Because the outcome is a count, we tested hypotheses using a
generalized linear model with a Poisson distribution in Proc Genmod of SAS 9.4 (Aiken, Mistler,
Coxe, & West, 2015).2 There was a condition effect χ2(2; N = 85) = 18.68, p = .0001, such that
participants generated more solutions to the creativity task in the self-enhancement condition (M
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= 25.04, SD = 11.14) than in either the control condition (M = 20.48, SD = 7.99), χ2(1; N = 85) =
12.53, p = .0004, d = 0.83, 95% CI (0.3712, 1.2921) or the self-effacement condition (M = 20.03,
SD = 6.66), χ2(1; N = 85) = 15.54, p = .0001, d = 0.95, 95% CI (0.4757, 1.4163), and the latter
conditions did not differ, χ2(1; N = 85) = 0.15, p = .7014, d = 0.08, 95% CI (-0.3415, 0.5096).
Creativity of the solutions. An ANOVA revealed a condition effect, F(2, 79) = 3.41, p
= .0379, such that solutions were more creative in the self-enhancement condition (M = 2.22, SD
= 0.26) than in the control condition (M = 2.03, SD = 0.25), F(1, 79) = 6.64, p = .0118, d = 0.75,
95% CI (0.1985, 1.2919), and the control condition did not differ from the self-effacement
condition (M = 2.15, SD = 0.31), F(1, 79) = 2.68, p = .1057, d = 0.43, 95% CI (-0.1077, 0.9616).
Although the means were in the expected direction, the creativity of the solutions in the selfenhancement condition did not differ from the self-effacement condition, F(1, 79) = 0.94, p =
.3345, d = 0.24, 95% CI (-0.7801, 0.2908).
Discussion
This results are consistent with the possibility that self-enhancement facilitates task
performance. Participants randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to creativity generated
more solutions to a creativity task than did control participants and blind judges deemed the
solutions of self-enhancing participants as more creative than those of control participants. The
only inconsistency is that the creativity of the solutions generated by participants in the selfenhancement condition did not differ from those of participants in the self-effacement condition.
In Experiment 2 we replicate Experiment 1 and add a fourth condition. As we reviewed,
work on academic exaggeration suggests that exaggeration of current (but not past) performance
is associated with self-enhancement motivation and academic improvement. Another way to
think about the current vs. past distinction is in terms of whether enhancement occurs on a
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dimension that is relevant vs. irrelevant to the task. Self-enhancing on a dimension relevant to
the performance task might facilitate performance more so than does self-enhancing on an
irrelevant dimension. For example, engaging in self-favoring thoughts about one’s ability to
endure pain might boost performance on an endurance race but have negligible effect on a
driving test. To test this possibility, we included a fourth condition in which participants selfenhance on a dimension other than creativity before completing the creativity task.
Experiment 2
Participants and Procedure
One hundred and fifty undergraduates (71 females, 76 males, 3 unspecified) at a
Southeastern university participated for partial credit in an introductory psychology course. We
decided a priori to collect data from the beginning until the end of the semester. We randomly
assigned participants to the control condition (n = 34), creativity self-enhancement condition (n =
40), creativity self-effacement condition (n = 38), or task-irrelevant self-enhancement condition
(n = 38). The procedure for the first three conditions was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Participants in the task-irrelevant self-enhancement condition began the session by generating a
personally important trait, wrote a narrative in which they self-enhanced in regard to that trait
using the instructions from O’Mara et al. (2012; the exact wording is quoted in “The Current
Work” section above), and then completed the creativity task (participants did not generate
“creativity” as their important trait). Participants were then thanked and debriefed.
Results
Two judges independently read the narratives to ensure that participants self-enhanced or
self-effaced as instructed. On that basis, we excluded 15 participants (nine, five, and one,
respectively, from the creativity self-enhancement, creativity self-effacement, and task-irrelevant
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self-enhancement conditions) bringing the effective sample size to 135. We computed a
subjective creativity score for each participant as we did in Experiment 1 and the inter-rater
reliability and correlation between judges was high for each object, αbrick = .80, rbrick = .68 and
αcandle = .77, rcandle = .62. We misplaced solutions from five participants before transcription (one,
two, and two, respectively from the task-irrelevant self-enhancement, creativity selfenhancement, and creativity self-effacement conditions) yielding an effective sample size of 130
for this outcome.
Number of solutions. The generalized linear model with a Poisson distribution revealed
a condition effect, χ2(3; N = 135) = 30.75, p = .0001, such that only task-relevant selfenhancement facilitated performance beyond the control. In particular, participants generated
more solutions in the self-enhancement condition (M =26.48, SD = 10.56) than in the control
condition (M = 22.71, SD = 7.88), χ2(1; N = 135) = 9.43, p = .0021, d = 0.55, 95% CI (0.1983,
0.8979). Participants in the control condition generated as many solutions as did participants in
the task-irrelevant self-enhancement condition (M = 21.43, SD = 6.83), χ2(1; N = 135) = 1.30, p
= .2536, d = 0.20, 95% CI (-0.1418, 0.5362), and more solutions than did participants in the
creativity self-effacement condition (M = 20.18, SD = 7.43), χ2(1; N = 135) = 4.97, p = .0259, d
= 0.39, 95% CI (0.0472, 0.7348).
Creativity of the solutions. An ANOVA revealed no condition effect, F(3,126) = 0.55, p
= .6470, such that the creativity of the solutions did not vary among the creativity selfenhancement (M = 1.84, SD = 0.23), control (M = 1.85, SD =0.27), creativity self-effacement (M
= 1.83, SD = 0.29), and task-irrelevant self-enhancement (M = 1.77, SD = 0.22) conditions.
Discussion
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The results for the number of generated solutions replicates that of Experiment 1 such
that participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to creativity
subsequently generated more solutions to the creativity task than did control participants.
Furthermore, the addition of the task-irrelevant self-enhancement condition reveals that the
facilitative effect of self-enhancement occurs only if self-enhancement is task-relevant. Indeed,
participants who self-enhanced on an important but creativity-irrelevant dimension generated no
more solutions to the creativity task than did control participants. These patterns are conceptually
similar to the findings in the academic exaggeration literature indicating that exaggeration of a
current (but not a past) performance improves subsequent performance and suggests that it is the
relevance of the exaggerated dimension that matters.
Inclusion of the task-irrelevant self-enhancement condition also helps distinguish selfenhancement, per se, from self-affirmation. As Taylor and Sherman (2008) indicate, the major
distinction by which self-enhancement and self-affirmation maintain self-worth is that selfenhancing processes operate on the dimension on which the self is being assessed whereas selfaffirming processes operate on a dimension other than that on which the self is being assessed.
The self-affirmation literature, for example, indicates that persons are more accepting of
threatening health information (Sherman, Nelson, Steele, 2000) and more tolerant of threating
outgroups (Fein & Spencer, 1997) if they initially affirm a value or attribute that is self-important
but irrelevant to the threat (also see Liu & Steele, 1986; Steele & Liu, 1983). That task
performance was facilitated in the current study by self-enhancing on a task-relevant but not a
task-irrelevant dimension suggests that the facilitative effect was a product of self-enhancement
more so than self-affirmation.
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Inconsistent with the results of Experiment 1 was the lack of an effect of selfenhancement (task-relevant or not) on the judged creativity of the solutions. One possibility for
this inconsistency, which we examine in Experiment 3, is the presence of an unmeasured
moderator. Perhaps task-relevant self-enhancement yields the persistence necessary to generate
more solutions, but the quality of those solutions might further depend on the person’s creative
ability. In other words, self-enhancement might boost creative quality only for persons who are
predisposed to be creative. Because creativity involves an ability to “form numerous and unusual
associations” (Barron & Harrington, 1981, p. 12) we suspect that a predisposition to think
abstractly would aid the creative process and moderate the effect of self-enhancement. Selfenhancement might increase the creative quality of persons high (but not low) in abstractness.
Experiment 3
Following Insko et al. (2001), we assess a predisposition to think abstractly with a
combination of the Openness-Intellect scale of the Big Five and the Intuition subscale of the
Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1984).3 We also examine a potential mediator. In
particular, we examine whether self-enhancement fosters a feeling of vitality (i.e., or
colloquially, “get’s people psyched”) that facilitates performance.
Participants and Procedure
Two hundred and twenty six undergraduates (100 females, 125 males, 1 unspecified) at a
private Midwestern university participated for partial credit in an introductory psychology
course. We decided a priori to collect data from the beginning until the end of the semester and
randomly assigned participants to the control condition (n = 108) or creativity self-enhancement
condition (n = 118).
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Participants sat in individual cubicles and completed the Big-Five Personality Inventory
(John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008) and the Keirsey Temperament
Sorter (Keirsey & Bates, 1984). Participants self-enhanced in regard to creativity or not (control
condition) as in Experiments 1 and 2 before completing a state version of the Subjective Vitality
Scale (Ryan & Frederick, 1997; α = .89; e.g., “I feel energized right now”) and the creativity
task, with the order of the latter two counterbalanced. Participants were debriefed and thanked.
Results
Two judges independently read the narratives to ensure that participants self-enhanced as
instructed. On that basis, we excluded nine participants. We further excluded 14 additional
participants: one in the control condition who informed the experimenter that a previous
participant shared the purpose of the study, four in the self-enhancement condition who provided
unusable responses to the creativity task, and nine non-native English speakers who informed the
experimenter that they were confused by various aspects of the study (three in the selfenhancement condition and six in the control condition). The effective sample size was 203.
We computed a subjective creativity score for each participant as we did previously and
the inter-rater reliability and correlation between judges was reasonable for each object, αbrick =
.65, rbrick = .51 and αcandle = .80, rcandle = .67. We misplaced solutions from 11 participants before
transcription (five from the self-enhancement condition and six from the control condition)
yielding an effective sample size of 192 for this outcome. We formed an index of abstract
thinking by standardizing the scores to the Openness subscale (α = .76) of the Big Five and the
Intuition subscale (α = .76) of the Kiersey Temperament Sorter and averaging the two
standardized scores – the scales correlated at r(201) = .52, p = .0001. Results of analyses using
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either openness or intuition yield the same conclusions based on p-values and direction of effects
as what we report subsequently with the combined index.
Subjective vitality. A Condition (self-enhance, control) x Order (vitality-then-creativity,
creativity-then-vitality) factorial ANOVA revealed no effects, F’s(1, 202) < 0.37. The lack of a
condition effect eliminates subjective vitality as a mediator of self-enhancement.
Number of solutions. The generalized linear model with a Poisson distribution revealed
that participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to creativity generated
more solutions to the creativity task (M = 24.26 SD = 7.89) than did the control participants (M =
22.65, SD = 8.43), χ2(1; N = 203) = 5.61, p = .0178, d = 0.34, 95% CI (0.0582, 0.6162). Adding
to the model mean-centered abstractness and Abstractness x Condition revealed that abstractness
positively predicted the number of solutions generated, B = 0.09, SE = 0.02, 95% CI (0.0623,
0.1282), χ2(1; N = 203) = 32.16, p = .0001. That is, more abstract minded participants generated
more solutions than did less abstract minded participants. However, the interaction was not
significant, B = -0.02, SE = 0.02, 95% CI (-0.0525, 0.0133), χ2(1; N = 203) = 1.36, p = .2438,
indicating that abstractness did not moderate the effect of self-enhancement.
Creativity of the solutions. An ANOVA for condition revealed that the solutions
generated by participants in the self-enhancement condition were deemed to be more creative (M
= 2.73, SD = 0.39) than the solutions generated by participants in the control condition (M =
2.61, SD = 0.36), F(1, 190) = 5.07, p = .0255, d = 0.32, 95% CI (0.0428, 0.5966). Adding to the
model mean-centered abstractness and Abstractness x Condition revealed that abstractness
positively predicted the creativity of the solutions, B = 0.13, SE = 0.03, 95% CI (0.0668, 0.1865),
F(1, 188) = 17.45, p = .0001, such that the solutions of more abstract minded participants were
deemed to be more creative than the solutions of less abstract minded participants. However, the
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interaction was not significant, B = 0.02 SE = 0.03, 95% CI (-0.0426, 0.0770), F(1, 188) = 0.32,
p = .5713, indicating that abstractness did not moderate the effect of self-enhancement.
Discussion
The results were consistent with the possibility that self-enhancement facilitates
performance. Participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to creativity
generated more solutions and more creative solutions (as rated by judges) to the creativity task
than did control participants. Our supposition that such an effect is mediated by feeling energized
appears incorrect. Self-enhancement had no effect on subjective vitality. Also, our supposition
that self-enhancement would most benefit the creative performance of persons predisposed to
creativity appears incorrect. Although more abstract-minded persons generated more solutions
and more creative solutions than did less abstract minded persons, abstractness did not moderate
the effect of self-enhancement. Self-enhancement facilitated performance regardless of the
participant’s abstractness. In Experiment 4 we replicate the current procedure to again test the
moderating effect of abstractness and the mediating potential of vitality. In addition, we examine
another potential mediator: self-efficacy (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Experiment 4
Participants and Procedure
Two hundred and twenty undergraduates (126 females, 93 males, 1 unspecified) at a
private Midwestern university participated for partial credit in an introductory psychology
course. We determined sample size based on Experiment 3, with the goal of obtaining 200
participants which required two academic semesters. We randomly assigned participants to the
control condition (n = 112) or creativity self-enhancement condition (n = 108). The procedure
and materials were identical to Experiment 3 with the exception that participants additionally
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completed a general self-efficacy scale and a task-specific self-efficacy scale. We randomized
the order in which participants completed the vitality, general self-efficacy, and task-specific
self-efficacy scales and counterbalanced whether they were all completed before or after the
creativity task. The general self-efficacy scale (Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale; Schwarzer &
Jerusalem, 1995) consisted of 10 items in which participants rated (1 = not at all to 4 = exactly
true) their general belief in accomplishing goals (e.g., “I can always manage to solve difficult
problems if I try hard enough”). Following Bandura’s (1982) conceptualization of self-efficacy
as domain specific, we created a 6-item creativity self-efficacy scale. Participants rated their
confidence (0 = not at all confident to 100 = completely confident) in their creative ability (e.g.,
How confident are you that you are able to: “generate creative responses...successfully complete
the creativity test”). We subsequently debriefed and thanked participants.
Results
Two judges independently read the narratives to ensure that participants self-enhanced as
instructed. On that basis, we excluded nine participants. We further excluded 10 additional
participants: one in the self-enhancement condition who provided unusable responses to the
creativity task, three who informed the experimenter that a previous participant shared the
purpose of the study (one in the self-enhancement condition and two in the control condition),
and six non-native English speakers who informed the experimenter that they were confused by
various aspects of the study (four in the self-enhancement condition and two in the control
condition). The effective sample size was 201, with the exception of analyses involving vitality
(α = .88), general self-efficacy (α = .78), and task-specific self-efficacy (α = .92) for which the
effective sample size was 200 because one participant did not complete those measures.
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We computed a subjective creativity score for each participant as we did previously –
however, we had four rather than two judges because the first pair of judges finished their RA
assignment before rating all solutions. So, we obtained a second pair of judges to rate the
remaining solutions. To ensure that the four judges agreed in their ratings we had the second pair
of judges additionally rate a subset of the solutions (n = 400) rated by the first pair. For that
subset, the four judges evidenced high reliability: αbrick = .87, αcandle = .86 (and the two pairs of
judges yielded similar creativity means, r = .74). For the items rated separately by each pair of
judges, the inter-rater reliability and correlation was high for each object for pair 1 (αbrick = .81,
rbrick = .72, and αcandle = .86, rcandle = .76) and for pair 2 (αbrick = .81, rbrick = .69, and αcandle = .85,
rcandle = .74). We formed an index of abstract thinking as we did in the previous study by
averaging the standardized responses to the Openness subscale (α = .80) of the Big Five and the
Intuition subscale (α = .71) of the Kieresy Temperament Sorter – the scales correlated at r(199) =
.56. Results of analyses using either openness or intuition yield the same conclusions based on pvalues and direction of effects as what we report subsequently with the combined index.
Possible mediators. We submitted vitality, general self-efficacy, and task-specific selfefficacy to a Condition (self-enhance, control) x Order (measured-mediator-then-creativity,
creativity-then-measured-mediator) factorial ANOVAs to examine their potential as mediators.
Subjective-vitality. A condition effect, F(1, 196) = 4.23, p = .041, d = 0.29, 95% CI
(0.0067, 0.5644), indicates that participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance
reported greater vitality (M = 4.71, SD = 0.96) than did control participants (M = 4.39, SD =
1.24). This effect was not moderated by order (i.e., Condition x Order), F(1, 196) = 2.05, p =
.1542. Based on these patterns subjective-vitality stands as a possible mediator of selfenhancement (a formal test is below).
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General self-efficacy. There were no effects on general self-efficacy, F’s(1, 196) < 0.71.
The lack of a condition effect eliminates general self-efficacy as a mediator of self-enhancement.
Task-specific self-efficacy. A condition effect, F(1, 196) = 4.33, p = .0388, d = 0.29,
95% CI (0.0088, 0.5661), indicates that participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance
reported greater creativity-specific self-efficacy (M = 64.30, SD = 18.12) than did control
participants (M = 59.02, SD = 18.58). This effect was not moderated by order (i.e., Condition x
Order), F(1, 196) = 2.49, p = .1159. Based on these patterns task-specific self-efficacy stands as
a possible mediator of self-enhancement (a formal test is below).4
Number of solutions. A generalized linear model with a Poisson distribution revealed
that participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to creativity generated
more solutions to the creativity task (M = 23.26, SD = 6.99) than did the control participants (M
= 21.78, SD = 6.67), χ2(1; N = 201) = 4.87, p = .0273, d = 0.32, 95% CI (0.0353, 0.5951).
Furthermore, adding to the model mean-centered abstractness and Abstractness x Condition
revealed that abstractness positively predicted the number of solutions generated, B = 0.07, SE =
0.02, 95% CI (0.0409, 0.1085), χ2(1; N = 201) = 18.73, p < .0001, such that more abstract
participants generated more solutions than did less abstract participants. The interaction was not
significant, B = -0.02, SE = 0.02, 95% CI (-0.0563, 0.0114) χ2(1; N = 201) = 1.69, p = .1933,
indicating that abstractness did not moderate the effect of self-enhancement.
Next, we examined whether vitality or task-specific self-efficacy mediated the effect of
self-enhancement on the number of solutions generated. As we previously reported, selfenhancement increased both reported vitality and creativity self-efficacy. Adding vitality and
task-specific self-efficacy to separate Poisson distributed general linear models that included the
enhance vs. control manipulation yielded results consistent with their potential as mediators in
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that the number of solutions generated by participants was positively related to their vitality, B =
0.03, SE = 0.01, 95% CI (0.0084, 0.0611), χ2(1; N = 200) = 6.66, p = .0098, and task-specific
self-efficacy, B = 0.004, SE = 0.001, 95% CI (0.0021, 0.0053), χ2(1; N = 201) = 20.25, p = .0001.
To formally test the indirect (i.e., mediated) effect we used Valeri and VanderWeele’s (2013)
bootstrapping approach that is appropriate for the count-based dependent measure (i.e., number
of uses). The approach scales the indirect effect as a risk ratio because it is estimating an effect,
in part, from a generalized linear model with a Poisson distribution. Consequently, an indirect
effect with a 95% percentile-based confidence interval that overlaps 1.0 (rather than 0) is
inconsistent with mediation. This analysis produced a confidence interval consistent with
mediation for the indirect effect via task-specific self-efficacy (1.00090 to 1.04849), but not
vitality (0.99785 to 1.03283). That is, the data are consistent with the possibility that selfenhancement increased the participants’ self-efficacy at creativity, which, in turn, enabled them
to generate more solutions.
Creativity of the solutions. The solutions generated by participants randomly assigned
to self-enhance were deemed to be no more or less creative (M = 2.05, SD = 0.29) than of control
participants (M = 2.05, SD =0.30), F(1, 199) = 0.02, p = .8923, d = 0.00, 95% CI (-0.2773,
0.2773). To test whether the effect of self-enhancement varied by abstractness we regressed the
creativity rating on condition, mean-centered abstractness, and Abstractness x Condition.
Abstractness positively predicted creativity, B = 0.08, SE = 0.02, 95% CI (0.0386, 0.1321), F(1,
197) = 12.96, p = .0004, such that the solutions generated by more abstract participants were
deemed to be more creative than those generated by less abstract participants. The interaction,
however, was not significant, B = 0.01, SE = 0.02, 95% CI (-0.0321, 0.0611), F(1,197) = 0.38 p
= .5368, indicating that abstractness did not moderate the effect of self-enhancement.
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Because it is possible for an independent variable to have an indirect (i.e., mediated)
effect on an outcome despite no apparent total effect on that outcome (MacKinnon, Lockwood,
Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002), we examined whether self-enhancement indirectly affected the
creativity of the solutions via subjective-vitality or task-specific self-efficacy. We first conducted
separate regression models in which the creativity rating was regressed on either vitality or taskspecific self-efficacy along with the enhance-vs.-control manipulation. Those analyses were
consistent with the possibility that task-specific self-efficacy, but not vitality, was a mediator in
that the rated creativity of the solutions was positively related to task-specific self-efficacy, B =
0.0041, SE = 0.0011, 95% CI (0.0019, 0.0063), F(1, 197) = 13.33, p = .0003, but not vitality, B =
0.0002, SE = 0.0188, 95% CI (-0.0369, 0.0374), F(1, 197) = 0.00, p = .9899. We formally tested
mediation using the bootstrapping procedure of the PROCESS macro for SAS (Hayes, 2013).
The 95% percentile-based confidence interval was consistent with mediation (i.e., excluded 0)
for the indirect effect via task-specific self-efficacy (0.0003 to 0.0584), but not vitality (-0.0164,
0.0155). That is, the data are consistent with the possibility that self-enhancement increased
participants’ self-efficacy at creativity, which, in turn, enabled them to generate particularly
creative solutions.
Discussion
The results were again consistent with the possibility that self-enhancement facilitates
task performance. Participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to
creativity subsequently generated more solutions to a creativity task than did control participants.
Furthermore, tests of mediation were consistent with the possibility that task-specific selfefficacy (but not general self-efficacy) mediates self-enhancement on the number of generated
solutions and the creativity of those solutions. As in Experiment 3, subjective vitality did not
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yield evidence consistent with mediation. Likewise, level of abstractness facilitated performance
on the creativity task but did not moderate the effect of self-enhancement. We consider in the
General Discussion why abstractness did not serve as a moderator and what it might (and might
not) imply more generally for the facilitative effect of self-enhancement on task performance.
Before doing so, however, we sought to ensure that our observed effect of selfenhancement on task performance is not unique to the creativity task and is a more basic
property of self-enhancement that can generalize to other domains. We address this issue in
Experiment 5 in which we again test the facilitative effect of self-enhancement on task
performance and the possibility of mediation through task-specific self-efficacy but we do so on
a different performance domain.
Experiment 5
To assess whether the performance facilitating effect of self-enhancement extends
beyond the domain of creativity, we replicated the previous study using a cold-pressor task,
which is typically used to study pain (Edens & Gill, 1995; Mitchel, MacDonald, & Brodie,
2004). In the cold-pressor task, participants immerse an arm in an ice bath to provide measures
of pain threshold (i.e., duration until first felt pain) and pain tolerance (i.e., duration until pain is
intolerable). We randomly assigned participants to self-enhance or not in regard to their ability to
endure discomfort before they engaged in the cold-pressor task. We had no prediction as to
whether self-enhancement would affect pain threshold. We did, however, expect it to increase
pain tolerance such that participants who self-enhance in regard to discomfort endurance should
persist in the ice bath longer than do control participants.
Participants and Procedure
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We restricted participation to persons without vascular or circulatory problems and
without cuts, scrapes, open wounds, or joint diseases in their arms or hands. Two hundred and
twenty five undergraduates (137 females, 88 males) at a private Midwestern university
participated for partial credit in an introductory psychology course. We determined sample size
with the goal of at least 200 observations, which required two academic semesters. We based our
estimated sample size on a power analysis for at least 80% power assuming a small effect size of
d = .20 – given the new performance domain we were uncertain of the effect size and erred on
the side of it being small. We randomly assigned participants to the control condition (n = 109)
or self-enhancement condition (n = 116).
Upon arrival to the lab, the experimenter explained that the study involved endurance and
recorded the participant’s height, weight, and body temperature. Participants in the control
condition subsequently engaged in the cold-pressure task, in which they submerged their nondominant hand (up to the forearm) in a cooler filled with ice water maintained at approximately 2
C. Participants were instructed to announce when they first felt pain (pain threshold) and to
keep their arm submerged for as long as possible (pain tolerance). The experimenter
surreptitiously recorded with a concealed stopwatch pain threshold and pain tolerance. In
accordance with the local Institutional Review Board, the experimenter terminated the task if the
participant persisted in the ice bath for 15 min.
Participants in the self-enhancement condition also completed the cold-pressor task, but
they did so after writing a narrative in which they self-enhanced in regard to enduring discomfort
as specified by the following instructions:
Think back over the past two weeks – replay in your mind the things you have done and
experienced. In as much detail as possible describe how the things you have done and
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experienced demonstrate that you have the ability to endure discomfort. That is, explain
with examples from the past two-weeks, how enduring discomfort is more characteristic
of you than it is of other college students.
As in Experiment 4, all participants completed measures of subjective vitality, general
self-efficacy, and task-specific self-efficacy. We randomized the order in which they completed
those measures and counterbalanced whether they completed all of the measures before or after
the cold-pressor task. We assessed vitality and general self-efficacy using the same scales as in
the previous experiment. For task-specific self-efficacy, participants rated on 5-items their
confidence (0 = not at all confident to 100 = completely confident) in their ability to endure
discomfort (e.g., How confident are you that you are able to: “endure the discomfort presented in
the task...show that you are a determined and tenacious person”).
Results
Two judges independently read the narratives to ensure that participants self-enhanced as
instructed. On that basis, we excluded three participants. We further excluded 27 additional
participants: one in the control condition who was timing the cold-pressor task, three non-native
English speakers who informed the experimenter that they were confused by various aspects of
the study (two in the self-enhancement condition and one in the control condition), eight who
informed the experimenter that they regularly take ice baths for sports rehabilitation (four in each
condition), and 15 who informed the experimenter that a previous participant shared the purpose
of the study (nine in the self-enhancement condition and six in the control condition). The
effective sample size was 195, with the exception of analyses involving (a) task-specific selfefficacy because two participants (one from each condition) did not complete that measure
yielding an effective samples size of 193 and (b) pain threshold because 11 participants (nine
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from the self-enhancement condition and two from the control condition) did not announce when
they first felt pain yielding an effective sample size of 184.
The latency scores (measured in seconds) for pain tolerance and pain threshold were
positively skewed and heteroskedastic. A natural log transformation corrected both the skew and
heteroskedasticity. We report inferential tests based on the transformed scores and, to facilitate
interpretation, we report descriptive statistics based on the raw scores.5
Possible mediators. We submitted vitality (α = .84), general self-efficacy (α = .78), and
task-specific self-efficacy (α = .92) to Condition (self-enhance, control) x Order (measuredmediator-then-cold-pressor, cold-pressor-then-measured-mediator) factorial ANOVAs.
Subjective-vitality. There were no effects on subjective vitality, F’s(1, 191) < 1.01. The
lack of a condition effect excludes subjective vitality as a mediator of self-enhancement.
General self-efficacy. There were no effects on general self-efficacy, F’s(1, 191) < 1.
The lack of a condition effect excludes general self-efficacy as a mediator of self-enhancement.
Task-specific self-efficacy. A condition effect, F(1, 189) = 4.03, p = .046, d = 0.29, 95%
CI (0.0054, 0.5726), indicates that participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance
reported greater discomfort-endurance self-efficacy (M = 75.54, SD = 17.59) than did control
participants (M = 70.11, SD = 19.39). That effect was not moderated by order (i.e., Condition x
Order), F(1, 189) = 0.47, p = .4959. These patterns suggest that task-specific self-efficacy is as a
possible mediator of self-enhancement (a formal test is below).
Pain threshold. Participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to
enduring discomfort waited non-significantly longer to announce when they first felt pain (M =
43.23s, SD = 52.01) than did control participants (M = 32.48s, SD = 36.09), F(1, 182) = 3.31, p =
.0705, d = 0.26, 95% CI (-0.0213, 0.5425). We examined the mediating potential of task-specific
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self-efficacy by simultaneously regressing pain threshold on self-efficacy and enhance-vs.control. The results were inconsistent with mediation in that self-efficacy did not predict pain
threshold, B = 0.0034, SE = 0.004, 95% CI (-0.0045, 0.0114), F(1, 180) = 0.74, p = .3907.
Indeed, a formal test of mediation using the bootstrapping procedure of the PROCESS macro for
SAS (Hayes, 2013) yielded a 95% percentile-based confidence interval that was inconsistent
with mediation for the indirect effect of task-specific self-efficacy (log transformed painthreshold: -0.0148 to 0.0388; raw pain-threshold: -0.8378 to 1.4708).
Pain tolerance. Participants who were randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to
enduring discomfort persisted longer in the ice bath (M = 236.57s, SD = 281.91) than did control
participants (M = 152.22s, SD = 197.55), F(1, 193) = 5.72, p = .0177, d = 0.34, 95% CI (0.0598,
0.6253). The same conclusion is reached when comparing the self-enhancement versus control
condition in regard to the duration between which participants announced that they first felt pain
and subsequently removed their arm from the water by performing either a between-condition
test of (a) the difference score (i.e., pain tolerance minus pain threshold) or (b) a regressed
difference (i.e., simultaneously regressing pain tolerance on pain threshold and condition, i.e.,
enhance vs. control). Indeed, participants randomly assigned to self-enhance persisted longer in
the ice bath beyond their first felt pain than did control participants according to a test of the
condition effect on the difference score, F(1, 182) = 5.63, p = .0187, and the regressed
difference, F(1, 181) = 4.55, p = .0343.
We examined the mediating potential of task-specific self-efficacy by simultaneously
regressing pain tolerance on self-efficacy and enhance-vs.-control. The results were consistent
with mediation in that task-specific self-efficacy positively predicted pain tolerance, B = 0.0215,
SE = 0.0039, 95% CI (0.0137, 0.0292), F(1, 190) = 30.00, p = .0001. Likewise, a bootstrapped
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test of mediation using the PROCESS macro yielded a 95% percentile-based confidence interval
that was consistent with mediation via the indirect effect of task-specific self-efficacy (logtransformed pain-tolerance: 0.0032 to 0.1210; raw pain-tolerance: 0.6441 to 25.0647). Stated
otherwise, the data are consistent with the possibility that self-enhancement increased selfefficacy for enduring discomfort, which, enabled greater persistence on the cold-pressor task.
Discussion
To assess whether our previous findings would replicate in a performance domain other
than creativity we randomly assigned participants to self-enhance (or not) in regard to enduring
discomfort and assessed performance on a cold-pressor task. Analogous to the results of
Experiments 1 – 4, self-enhancement increased persistence in the ice bath and tests of mediation
were consistent with the possibility of mediation via task-specific self-efficacy (but not via
general self-efficacy or subjective vitality).
General Discussion
In their landmark article, Taylor and Brown (1988) proposed that self-enhancement
facilitates (among other benefits) task performance. They further offered self-efficacy as a
plausible mediator, such that positively biased memories, judgments, and thoughts about the self
generate a sense of effective agency that promotes a tenacity to achieve. Longitudinal studies
that measured self-enhancement (primarily in regard to academic achievement) and ensuing
performance are largely consistent with the possibility that self-enhancement facilitates
performance (Blanton et al., 1999; Gramzow et al., 2003; Gramzow, Johnson, & Willard, 2014;
Willard & Gramzow, 2009; cf., Robins and Beer, 2001).
The purpose of the current research was to experimentally test whether self-enhancement
facilitates task performance by manipulating (rather than measuring) self-enhancement. In each
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of five experiments, we randomly assigned participants to engage in self-enhancing memory and
judgment in regard to a performance domain before engaging in a test of that domain. The results
were consistent with the possibility that self-enhancement facilitates task performance. In
particular, participants in Experiments 1-4 who were randomly assigned to self-enhance in
regard to creativity subsequently generated more solutions and (with less consistency) more
creative solutions to a creativity task than did control participants. Similarly, participants in
Experiment 5 who were randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to enduring discomfort
persisted longer in the pain-inducing cold-pressor task than did control participants.
In addition to a control condition in which randomly assigned participants only
completed the given performance task, we randomly assigned participants to other comparison
conditions. Participants in the self-effacement condition generated negative thoughts about
themselves in regard to the performance domain. Participants in the task-irrelevant selfenhancement condition generated positive thoughts about themselves on a dimension irrelevant
to the performance domain. Only participants randomly assigned to self-enhance in regard to the
performance domain out performed the control participants. This implies that it is not simply
memories and thoughts about the domain or memories and thoughts about the positivity of the
self that facilitate performance, but instead performance is facilitated by memories and thoughts
that positively link the self with the performance domain. In other words, self-enhancement
operates as a goal-directed force. Enhancing in regard to speed, for example, should facilitate
performance on a running race but not on a spelling bee.
Mediation: Ruling-in and Ruling-out Possible Pathways
We examined potential mediators of self-enhancement’s facilitative effect. We assessed
the possibility that self-enhancement generates a feeling of vitality or energy (e.g., “getting
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psyched”) that heightens performance. We assessed such vitality in Experiments 3, 4, and 5 with
the Subjective Vitality scale (Ryan & Frederick, 1997). For neither the creativity task nor the
cold-pressor task did vitality evidence a complete pattern consistent with mediation. The selfenhancement manipulation increased vitality in Experiment 4 but not in Experiments 3 and 5. In
Experiment 4, vitality positively predicted (independent of the manipulation) the number of
generated solutions (but not the creativity of those solutions), but the estimated indirect effect
indicated that vitality was not a mediator. Vitality, or at least our operationalization of vitality,
appears not to be a mediator of self-enhancement’s effect on performance.
We assessed in Experiments 4 and 5 the mediating potential of two forms of selfefficacy. We assessed with the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) a
domain-independent belief in one’s capacity to respond to difficult situations and overcome
obstacles. Adhering to Bandura’s (1982) conceptualization that self-efficacy is domain specific,
we also assessed self-efficacy in regard to the performance domain (i.e., creativity, enduring
discomfort). The self-enhancement manipulation had no impact on the domain-independent form
of generalized self-efficacy, thereby eliminating it as a mediator. On the other hand, the domainspecific form of self-efficacy evidenced a complete pattern consistent with mediation on both the
creativity and cold-pressor task: (a) The self-enhancement manipulations increased self-efficacy
in regard to creativity and enduring discomfort, respectively; (b) Self-efficacy at creativity and
enduring discomfort positively predicted (independent of the self-enhancement manipulation)
performance on the creativity task and pain-inducing cold-pressor task, respectively; (c) Finally,
estimates of the indirect effect from self-enhancement to each performance measure were
consistent with the possibility of mediation via domain-specific self-efficacy. These studies
suggest that engaging in self-enhancing memory and thought about the self in regard to a given
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performance domain fosters a sense of efficacy in that domain, which, in turn, facilitates
performance in that domain. These data are consistent with Taylor and Brown’s (1988)
proposition that self-enhancement facilitates task performance by fostering a sense of efficacy.
Moderation: Are There Limits to Self-Enhancement’s Performance Facilitating Effect?
Self-enhancement cannot make the impossible possible. Ennobling the self with betterthan-average eagle-like attributes would ensure a fast thud rather than a graceful swoop from
cliff to ground. Given the inconsistency between Experiment 1 and 2 in the effect of selfenhancement on the subjective creativity of the generated solutions, we tested in Experiments 3
and 4 the possibility that self-enhancement interacts with skill/ability. We anticipated that selfenhancement would improve the creative quality of abstract minded persons who are predisposed
to creativity. Abstractness did indeed positively predict performance on the creativity task: more
abstract-minded participants generated more solutions and more creative solutions than did lessabstract minded participants. Yet, abstractness did not moderate the effect of self-enhancement.
The lack of a Self-Enhancement x Abstractness effect is consistent with the strong
argument that that self-enhancement facilitates performance regardless of skill, ability, or
predisposition and implies that self-enhancement can make the impossible possible, which we
deem impossible. Of course, another possibility is worth considering. We had sufficient variation
in our assessment of abstractness to observe its positive association with performance on the
creativity task. But, it is plausible that we lacked sufficient variation at the lower end of the
abstractness continuum to observe its moderating effect. Stated otherwise, our participants who
were “lower” in abstractness were abstract enough to benefit from self-enhancement. Indeed,
acceptance into college likely entails at least a modest level of abstract thinking and 75% of
participants in Experiments 3 and 4 scored above 3.20 on the Openness scale (anchored at 1 and
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5) and above 7 on the Intuition scale (anchored at 0 and 20). In this instance, sampling college
students likely limited our ability to observe the moderating effect of skill/ability/pre-disposition
on self-enhancement. Perhaps a sample more evenly distributed across the abstractness
continuum would have revealed that self-enhancement facilitates the creative quality of persons
predisposed for creativity, but not of persons who lack such a pre-disposition.
It is also worth considering whether unmeasured variation in the abstractness of our
judges contributed to the lesser consistency of the self-enhancement manipulation on the
subjective creativity rating than on the number of generated solutions. Assessing creativity is
certainly a fuzzier task than is a simple count and, in this instance, the adage “it takes one to
know one” might be apt. Perhaps we would have observed greater consistency between-studies
in the subjective creativity measure had we assessed the abstractness of our judges and formed a
creativity mean that was weighted by each judges’ abstractness.
While pondering issues of moderation, it is worth mentioning that we do not claim the
effect documented in the current research to be context invariant and unaffected by other factors.
As is the purpose of laboratory experiments, we created a controlled environment to test the
plausibility of an idea, namely Taylor and Brown’s (1988) proposition that self-enhancement has
a causal and positive effect on performance. Our results are consistent with that possibility but
the do not imply that self-enhancement always improves performance. Indeed, in Experiment 2
self-enhancement boosted performance when enhancement was task relevant, but not when it
was task irrelevant. In other contexts, even task-relevant self-enhancement might be ineffective.
In the current experiments, for example, there was no outcome (beyond self-admiration)
contingent on performance. If we incentivized participants with desirable rewards for their
performance (e.g., $100 per minute in the cold-pressor task), perhaps task-relevant self-

SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND TASK PERFORMANCE 36
enhancement would have a negligible effect. Surely other motivations and contexts can mute
(and yet others, intensify) the effect of self-enhancement. Nonetheless, the results are revealing
of human nature: Self-enhancement can facilitate performance. It goes beyond regulating selfworth and wellbeing and impacts behavior. Which might be why self-enhancement is so
prevalent (Sedikides & Skowronski, 2000; Sedikides, Skowronski, & Gaertner, 2004).
Connections and a Caveat
The current research has clear connections to other fields of research. Education research,
for example, has long embraced the importance of self-efficacy to academic performance
(Zimmerman, 2000). Initial research was troubled with inconsistent links between self-efficacy
and performance and, as Bandura (1982) argued, resolution came with assessments of selfefficacy that were specific to the performance task (Pajares, 1996). Our mediation tests of
generalized vs. domain-specific self-efficacy evidenced the same tendency. Interestingly, in his
review of the education literature, Pajares (p. 566) noted that “one of the thorniest problems...is
whether feeling good about oneself is primarily responsible for increased achievement or
whether successful performance is largely responsible for stronger feelings of self-worth.” Our
experiments de-thorn this issue and indicate that the former is indeed possible: self-enhancement
increases achievement. The field of Sports Psychology also emphasizes the link between selfefficacy and performance and, here too, substantially stronger positive associations with
performance are found among domain-specific than generalized measures of efficacy (Moritz,
Feltz, Fahrbach, & Mack, 200). Similarly, Organizational Psychology appreciates the importance
of self-efficacy for job performance (Gist & Mitchell, 1992).
A relevant issue for all of these fields is how to increase self-efficacy as a means of
improving performance. As we discussed previously, research indicates that self-efficacy
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develops from both performance feedback (Bandura & Jourden, 1991) and social comparison
feedback (Klein, 1997) demonstrating task proficiency. Perhaps one of the more interesting
findings of the current research is the possibility that efficacy beliefs can be auto-generated via
self-enhancement. Participants who were randomly assigned to engage in a positively biased
memory trace of their recent past in regard to creativity or discomfort endurance subsequently
reported stronger confidence in their efficacy in those domains. This occurred regardless of
whether we assessed self-efficacy before or after the performance task; thereby indicating that it
was the self-enhancing memory trace and not performance-based inferences that promoted selfefficacy. Although these findings are of strong theoretical interest, an important caveat is
necessary regarding their applied potential.
For the reader interested in improving personal performance, we caution against
concluding that self-enhancement alone is a good tool (e.g., Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, &
Vohs, 2003). There likely are other strategies that would provide a larger performance boost than
would mere self-enhancement. For athletes interested in improving their game or musicians
wanting to improve their recitals, we recommend practice and more practice (Macnamara,
Hambrick, Oswald, 2014). Self-enhancement without practice would likely be a fast track to
failure. Again, the purpose of our research was to test whether self-enhancement can improve
performance. We did not test whether self-enhancement is the best way or a good way to do so.
Conclusion
The current experiments indicate that self-enhancement facilitates task performance and
that facilitative effect is plausibly mediated, in part, by domain-specific self-efficacy. Returning
to Muhammad Ali, perhaps talent and training made him the greatest and his flair at selfenhancement enabled him to be “the double greatest.”
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Footnotes
1Participants

wrote their uses for the creativity test on separate slips of paper, which we

subsequently stapled together. The staples released for 19 participants from Experiments 1 – 4
(2.78% of the 682 participants) and their slips were lost before being transcribed in the database.
2We

computed a Cohen’s d and a 95% CI of the d for between condition comparisons of

the number of uses measure (for Experiments 1 – 4) using the corresponding χ2 and sample size
of the Poisson distributed inferential test.
3Insko

et al. (2001) used the Openness subscale of the Big Five and the Sensing-Intuition

scale of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, McCauley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998). IRB
concern with copyright infringement prevented our use of the Myers-Briggs. Hence, we used the
Intuition subscale of the Keirsey Temperament Sorter, which assesses the same construct as the
Sensing-Intuition scale (Tucker & Gillespie, 1993).
4Although

the Condition x Order interaction was not significant for vitality and task-

specific self-efficacy, the reader might find it interesting that, in each instance, the condition
effect was descriptively stronger when vitality and task-specific self-efficacy were assessed
before rather than after the creativity task. Such a pattern is entirely consistent with mediation in
that the pre-task assessment is not contaminated by self-inferences that may have occurred on the
creativity task (e.g., “I’m good at this”). The vitality means for the enhancement and control
conditions are 4.84 and 4.28, respectively when measured before the creativity task and 4.60 and
4.50 when measured after the creativity task. Likewise, the task-specific self-efficacy means for
the enhancement and control conditions are 65.99 and 56.45, respectively when measured before
the creativity task and 62.89 and 61.58 when measured after the creativity task.
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5Weight

and body temperature positively predicted pain threshold and height positively

predicted pain tolerance. Inclusion of height, weight, and body temperature as covariates does
not alter conclusions regarding self-enhancement and we report the results of tests that do not
include covariates.
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